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1 Introduction
The relationship between income distribution and economic outcomes such as growth
and welfare has been an important area in economic research (see, among others, the
discussion in Piketty and Saez 2003; Milanovic 2005, 2011; Atkinson et al. 2011).
In this paper, we contribute to an important strand in this literature: on the effects of
income distribution and inequality onmarket demand (see the discussion in Ibragimov
and Ibragimov 2007, and references therein). Specifically, we address how changes in
the income distribution affect the price elasticity of market demand.
The volume and growth of market demand are important concerns for national gov-
ernments, particularly so in the current global economic environment. In recent years
many governments, facing the need to balance demand growth with fiscal sustainabil-
ity, have modified their taxation and expenditure programmes. From the policy point
of view, it is useful to understand how changes in direct tax schedules work through
income distribution and affect market demand elasticity. We address this issue in this
paper.
Formal analysis of income and wealth inequality relies on the concepts of Lorenz
dominance and majorization (Marshall et al. 2011). These ordering relations enable
comparison of disparity among components of vectors (e.g., incomes in a population).
Over the past several years, a number of works in the literature have extended the
theory and applications for these ordering relations, and (Schur-convex) functions
that preserve them (see discussion in Ibragimov et al. 2015; Ibragimov and Prokhorov
2017).
Ibragimov and Ibragimov (2007) consider the market demand function for a good,
aggregated from individual demand functions with price and income as arguments.
Under the assumption of common preferences, they characterize the changes in price
elasticity of market demand following from changes in income distribution. For the
limited class of changes in income distribution where increases and decreases in
income inequality occur through non-intersecting Lorenz curve shifts, they show how
the increase or decrease in the price elasticity of market demand depends on the Schur-
convexity/Schur-concavity of the market demand function and convexity/concavity
properties of the individual demand functions.
Changes in income distributionwhere Lorenz curves intersect are farmore common
than changes in income distribution that take the form of non-intersecting Lorenz
curve shifts. One general example is polarization of incomes. Another is the change
in the distribution of after-tax income, after changes in tax schedules. For example,
when a graduated-rate progressive income tax is replaced by a flat tax, with increased
personal exemptions, the new Lorenz curve for after-tax income will intersect the
old one. Thus, it is useful to extend the results in Ibragimov and Ibragimov (2007)
to income distribution changes where Lorenz curves intersect. We establish sufficient
conditions under which price elasticity of market demand increases or decreases under
general changes in income distribution, allowing Lorenz curves to intersect as they
shift. Our analysis ties in the implications of the type of tax policy changes mentioned
above.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 sets out the concepts and definitions. In
Sect. 3, we extend the Ibragimov and Ibragimov (2007) results, determining sufficient
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conditions under which market demand elasticity for a consumption good increases or
decreases with income distribution changes where Lorenz curves intersect. In Sect. 4,
the results in Sect. 3 are applied to distributional consequences of direct tax policy.
Section 5 concludes. “Appendix 1” summarizes several concepts related to the analysis
in the paper. “Appendix 2” contains the proofs of the main results obtained. Section 3
and “Appendix 3” further illustrate implications of the main results in the paper using
several commonly used demand functions, such as the Almost Ideal Demand System
and demands for necessities, non-necessities and luxury goods.
2 Concepts
Consider a population consisting of K individuals, whose incomes xi , i = 1, . . . , K ,
lie in the interval [0, xˆ], xˆ < ∞. Let the K -vector x = (x1, . . . , xK ) represent
the distribution of the total income T = ∑Ki=1 xi in the population. Without loss
of generality, we also employ x to denote its rearrangement in the ascending order:(
x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(K )
)
.
Reframing the above set-up in terms of random variables allows us to bring the
Lorenz dominance relation into the analysis. Let X be a random variable (r.v.) with
a uniform distribution on the set {x1, . . . , xK } : P(X = xi ) = 1/K , i = 1, . . . , K .
Further, let FX (x), x ∈ , denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of X,
and let F−1X (t), t ∈ (0, 1), stand for the corresponding quantile function, that is,
F−1X (t) is the right continuous inverse distribution function corresponding to FX :
F−1X (t) = sup{x : F(x) ≤ t}, for 0 ≤ t < 1, and F−1X (1) = sup{x : F(x) < 1}, for
t = 1. On this basis, the mean μX of X (the average income x = (1/K )∑Ki=1 xi ) is
equal to μX =
∫ 1
0 F
−1
X (t)dt.
Definition 2.1 (Lorenz 1905; Gastwirth 1971;Marshall et al. 2011) The Lorenz curve
L X (u), u ∈ [0, 1] corresponding to the income distribution x = (x1, . . . , xn) (the r.v.
X ) is defined by1
L X (u) = 1
μX
∫ u
0
F−1X (t)dt for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1.
For the (non-random) income distribution vector x, L X (u) is the proportion of
the total income
∑K
i=1 xi that accrues to the uth fraction of K , cumulated from the
lowest end of incomewith the population ordered by size of income. The Lorenz curve
corresponding to x is the continuous piece-wise linear function that interpolates the
points
(
i/K ,
∑i
j=1 x( j)/
∑K
j=1 x( j)
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . , K , starting with the point (0,
0). The Lorenz curve is the basis for the Lorenz dominance relation, which induces a
partial order over income distributions based on the variability or disparity of incomes
in the population.
1 The definition of Lorenz curves readily generalizes to the case of continuous r.v.’s X representing income
distributions on [0, xˆ].
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The concept of majorization corresponds to the concept of Lorenz dominance with
the difference that while Lorenz dominance relation can be defined as a stochastic
relation that applies to random variables, the majorization relation relates to non-
random vectors.
Definition 2.2 (Arnold 2007; Marshall et al. 2011) For x, y ∈ K , x is said to be
majorized by y, (ymajorizes x; x ≺ y),2 if ∑ki=1 x(i) ≥
∑k
i=1 y(i), k = 1, . . . , K − 1
and
∑K
i=1 x(i) =
∑K
i=1 y(i).
The Lorenz order for discrete random variables corresponds to the majorization
order (Muirhead 1903; Hardy et al. 1934, 1952; Marshall et al. 2011) which applies
to non-random vectors: both relations define the same partial order over the set of
possible distributions of a total income, that is, over the set of distributions of the
income r.v. X on [0, xˆ] with the same mean, μX .
All commonly used indices of variability, including inequality, concentration,
risk, diversity are consistent with the partial order induced by Lorenz domi-
nance/majorization. These indices belong to the family of Schur-convex functions.
Definition 2.3 (Schur 1923;Marshall et al. 2011) A function(x), x = (x1, . . . , xK )
∈ A ⊆ K is said to be Schur-convex on A if x1, x2 ∈ A, x1 ≺ x2 implies that
(x1) ≤ (x2). For any interval I ⊆ , a continuously differentiable function
(x), x = (x1, . . . , xK ) , is Schur-convex on I K if and only if it is symmetric (under
permutations of arguments) in (x1, . . . xK ) ∈ I K and
(
xi − x j
)
(
∂
∂xi
(x) − ∂
∂x j
(x)
)
≥ 0, ∀ x ∈ I K .
It is useful to characterize the Schur-convexity of additive functions, e.g., themarket
demand function for a good that is aggregated from individual demand functions.
Theorem 2.1 (Marshall et al. 2011)For any interval I ⊆ , if the function φ : I → 
is convex, then, for x = (x1, . . . , xK ):
(x) =
K∑
i=1
φ(xi )
is Schur-convex on I K . Consequently, x1, x2 ∈ I K , x1 ≺ x2 implies (x1) ≤ (x2).
Further, if φ : I →  is continuous, then Schur-convexity of (x) = ∑Ki=1 φ(xi ) on
I K holds if and only if φ is convex on I.
Hardy et al. (1934) showed the equivalence of a number of ordering relations in the
comparison of variability or inequality in any two distributions x1 = (x11 , . . . , x1K ),
2 The concept goes back to Hardy et al. (1934). The choice between the notation x ≺ y and y  x in
representing the components of x being more equal to each other than those of y, as also the choice between
ordering the vector in ascending or descending orders has varied in the literature. We adopt the notation in
Arnold (2007), Marshall et al. (2011).
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x2 = (x21 , . . . , x2K ) of the same total T =
∑K
i=1 x1i =
∑K
i=1 x2i . One such relation
in their result (see below) is the Pigou–Dalton principle which states that an order
preserving regressive transfer (from a poorer person to a richer person) increases
inequality, and an order preserving progressive transfer (from a richer person to a
poorer person) decreases inequality. Income transfers between persons are said to be
order preserving if they leave the ordering of incomes unaltered.
Theorem 2.2 (Hardy et al. 1934; Marshall et al. 2011) Let x1 = (x11 , . . . , x1K ), x2 =
(x21 , . . . , x
2
K ) ∈ n, and let
∑K
i=1 xi1 =
∑K
i=1 xi2. Further let, as above, X1 and X2
denote r.v.’s with uniform distributions on the sets {x11 , . . . , x1K } and {x21 , . . . , x2K },
respectively: P(X1 = x1i ) = P(X2 = x2i ) = 1/K , i = 1, . . . , K . The following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) x1 is majorized by x2 : x1 ≺ x2
(ii) x1 is Lorenz dominated by x2 : L X1(u) ≥ L X2(u) for all u ∈ (0, 1)
(iii) x1 can be obtained from x2 by a non-empty finite sequence of order preserving
progressive transfers.
(iv) (x1) = ∑Ki=1 φ(x1i ) ≤ (x2) =
∑K
i=1 φ(x2i ) for every continuous convex
function φ :  → .
Any reasonable measure of variability, or inequality, must uphold the Pigou–Dalton
principle, and equivalently, be consistent with the partial order induced by Lorenz
dominance/majorization. Hence, they must be Schur-convex ( : [0, xˆ]K →  such
that(x1) ≤ (x2) for x1, x2 ∈ [0, xˆ]K if x1 can be obtained from x2 by a non-empty
finite sequence of order preserving progressive transfers). In this case, there is less
‘variability’ in distribution x1 than in distribution x2, asmeasured by any Schur-convex
function.
The Lorenz dominance / majorization order is partial in that the set of vectors with
intersecting Lorenz curves cannot be ordered based on those relations. Our analy-
sis is concerned with the price elasticity implications of general changes in income
distribution, allowing Lorenz curves to cross as they shift. We now turn to this.
Income distributions with intersecting Lorenz curves To proceed, it is useful to relate
crossing Lorenz curves with crossing of cdf’s of income distributions (r.v.’s on [0, xˆ]).
For any two distributions x1 = (x11 , . . . , x1K ), x2 = (x21 , . . . , x2K ) of the same total
income T = ∑Ki=1 x1i =
∑K
i=1 x2i , we denote by X1 and X2 the r.v.’s with uniform
distributions on the sets {x11 , . . . , x1K } and {x21 , . . . , x2K }, respectively: P(X1 = x1i ) =
P(X2 = x2i ) = 1/K , i = 1, . . . , K . Further, let FX1(x) and FX2(x) denote the
cdf’s of the r.v.’s X1 and X2, and L X1(u) and L X2(u) denote the Lorenz curves
corresponding to the income distribution vectors x1 and x2 (the income r.v.’s X1 and
X2). The following result on the relationship between the crossing of (continuous)
Lorenz curves (Definition 2.1) and the crossing of integrals of cdf’s is useful:
Proposition 2.1 (Chiu 2007)For real vectors x1 = (x11 , . . . , x1K ), x2 = (x21 , . . . , x2K )
with
∑K
i=1 x1i =
∑K
i=1 x2i
(
corresponding to r.v.’sX1, X2 with the same mean:μX1 =
μX2 = (1/K )
∑K
i=1 x1i = (1/K )
∑K
i=1 x2i
)
, L X1(u) crosses L X2(u) n times first from
above if and only if
∫ x
0 FX2(y)dy crosses
∫ x
0 FX1(y)dy n times first from above.
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It follows that if the integrals
∫ x
0 FX2(y)dy and
∫ x
0 FX1(y)dy do not cross, the
corresponding Lorenz curves do not cross. This case where there is a Lorenz domi-
nance relation between the two distributionswas analyzed in Ibragimov and Ibragimov
(2007).
Now consider the case of the integral
∫ x
0 FX2(y)dy crossing
∫ x
0 FX1(y)dy once
from above. By the above proposition L X1(u) crosses L X2(u) once from above. The
issue that comes into play when Lorenz curves cross, is the extent of “downside
inequality” in one distribution relative to the other. The Lorenz criterion has been
supplemented in the literature with the additional principle of “aversion to downside
inequality” (Davies and Hoy 1995), equivalently, the principle of “transfer sensitivity”
(Shorrocks and Foster 1987), accommodating the analysis of crossing Lorenz curves
(see “Appendix A” for the definition of downside inequality and related concepts).
The essential idea is that the transfer of any specific amount of income from a poorer
to a richer person should be considered more disequalizing, the lower this transfer
occurs in the distribution, other things being equal. The “weak” definition of transfer
sensitivity requires that inequality reduction resulting from an order preserving pro-
gressive transfer of a fixed size between participants the same distance apart should be
inversely related to the income of the donor (and recipient). (Weak) transfer sensitivity
completes the ordering of intersecting Lorenz curves that cross only once.
Definition 2.4 (Shorrocks and Foster 1987) A Schur-convex function  exhibits
transfer sensitivity (downside inequality aversion) if (x1) < (x2) whenever the
change of distribution from x1 to x2 (both real K -vectors with the same mean) is a
downside inequality increase.
Menezes et al. (1980) and Shorrocks and Foster (1987) showed that additive Schur-
convex functions of the type: (x) = ∑Ki=1 φ(xi ), where φ′ > 0 and φ′′ > 0,
are weakly transfer sensitive (equivalently, downside inequality averse) if and only if
φ′′′ < 0.3
Shorrocks and Foster (1987) showed that all downside inequality averse, additive
Schur-convex functions will agree on the ordering of Lorenz curves that intersect once,
if the distribution that has Lorenz curve that crosses the other from above has a lower
variance.4
Proposition 2.2 (Shorrocks and Foster 1987) Let x1 = (x11 , . . . , x1K ), x2 = (x21 , . . . ,
x2K ) be real vectors with
∑K
i=1 x1i =
∑K
i=1 x2i , and suppose that L X1(u) crosses
L X2(u) once from above. Then the variance of the r.v. X
1 is not greater than the
variance of the r.v. X2 (V (X1) ≤ V (X2)) if and only if (x1) < (x2) for any
additive Schur-convex function  exhibiting transfer sensitivity.
3 Throughout the paper, φ′′m (P, x) and φ′′′m (P, x) denote the second and third derivatives of φm (P, x)with
respect to x .
4 Throughout the paper, for a r.v. X, V (X) = E(X − μX )2 denotes its variance; so that for the r.v.
X with uniform distribution on the set {x1, . . . , xK } of components of the income distribution vector
x = (x1, . . . , xK ) with x = (1/K )
∑K
i=1 xi : P(X = xi ) = 1/K , i = 1, . . . , K , one has V (X) =
(1/K )
∑K
i=1(xi − x)2.
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For real vectors x1, x2 with the same mean income, the condition
∫ xˆ
0
∫ t
0 [FX2(y) −
FX1(y)]dydt ≥ 0 is the same as V (X1) ≤ V (X2) (that is, the variance of the r.v. X1
is not greater than that of the r.v. X2). Based on Proposition 2.2 above, it is easy to
compare transfer sensitivity when V (X1) ≤ V (X2). But the result does not help in
the case where the distribution with its Lorenz curve crossing that of the other from
above has larger variance.
This gap in the ordering of distributions was filled by Chiu (2007), where the result
has also been generalized from single-crossing Lorenz curves to multiple-crossing
Lorenz curves. Based on Proposition 6.1 (“Appendix 1”), Chiu (2007) showed that
relative ranking of two distributions by any additive Schur-convex function (x) =∑K
i=1 φ(xi ) is determined by its degree of inequality aversion and its degree of transfer
sensitivity (downside inequality aversion). In the special case of single-crossingLorenz
curves, the ratio −φ′′′/φ′′ measures the strength of transfer sensitivity (downside
inequality aversion) of the function φ against its inequality aversion, and determines
the Schur-convex function’s ranking of x1 and x2.5
Proposition 2.3 (Chiu 2007) Suppose  and  are additive Schur-convex functions
and, for x1 = (x11 , . . . , x1K ), x2 = (x21 , . . . , x2K ) with
∑K
i=1 x1i =
∑K
i=1 x2i , the Lorenz
curve L X1(u) crosses the Lorenz curve L X2(u) once from above and V (X
1) > V (X2).
Then (i) and (i i) are equivalent.
(i) (x2) ≥ (x1) implies (x2) ≥ (x1)
(ii) −φ′′′(x)
φ′′(x) ≤ −ψ
′′′(x)
ψ ′′(x) for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
From the results inChiu (2007) presented in this section and “Appendix1”, it follows
that the following holds in the case of single-crossing Lorenz curves, where L X1(u)
crosses L X2(u) once from above and x
2 can be obtained from x1 by a combination of
a downside inequality increase and an inequality decrease due to a sequence of order
preserving progressive transfers (called Pigou–Dalton inequality decrease). If x2 and
x1 map to the same value of an additive Schur-convex function (i.e., if is ameasure
of inequality, x2 and x1 are judged “equally unequal”), then another additive Schur-
convex function with−[ψ ′′′(x)]/[ψ ′′(x)] uniformly larger than−[φ′′′(x)]/[φ′′(x)]
will map x2 to a higher value (“more unequal”) than x1 (Chiu 2007). We apply these
results to characterizing the changes in price elasticity of market demandwhen income
distributions change.
3 Price elasticity of market demand and income distribution
Ibragimov and Ibragimov (2007) consider K consumers and M goods in a market.
Let m(P, x) = ∑Ki=1 φim(P, xi ) denote the market demand function for good
m, where φim(P, xi ) is the demand function of the i th individual for the good,
P = (p1, . . . , pM ) is the vector of prices for the M goods in the economy, and
x = (x1, . . . , xK ) is the vector of incomes of the consumers. As in Ibragimov and
Ibragimov (2007), throughout the paper, we suppose that all consumers have the same
5 The above ratio is referred to as “prudence” in the context of utility functions (Kimball 1990).
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preferences. Thus:
φ1m(P, x) = φ2m(P, x) = · · · = φK m(P, x) = φm(P, x)
Denote the cross-price elasticity of the aggregate demand on the m-th good with
respect to the l-th good’s price by eml = ∂logm(P, x)/∂logpl . Denote the domain
of the function φm(P, x) by S1 ∈ RM+1, and let S2 = {(P, x) = (P, x1, . . . , xK ) ∈
M+K |(P, xi ) ∈ S1, i = 1, . . . , K } be the domain of the function m(P, x).
Theorem 3.1 (Ibragimov and Ibragimov 2007) Let goods m and l be complements.
Then:
(i) If the functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl are convex with respect to x for
(P, x) ∈ S1, then the conditions (P, x1), (P, x2) ∈ S2 and x1 ≺ x2 imply
|eml(x1)| ≥ |eml(x2)|.
(ii) If the functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl are concave with respect to x for
(P, x) ∈ S1, then the conditions (P, x1), (P, x2) ∈ S2 and x1 ≺ x2 imply
|eml(x1)| ≤ |eml(x2)|.
Thus, a change in the income distribution will increase or decrease market demand
elasticity, depending on whether the individual demand functions φm(P, x) and their
derivatives are convex or concave in income levels x ; equivalently, by Theorem 2.1,
on whether the market demand function m(P, x) and its first derivatives are Schur-
convex or Schur-concave with respect to vectors x representing income distributions.
The first part of the above Theorem states that the more variable, i.e., unequal, is the
distribution of income, the smaller is the cross-price elasticity of demand for the m-th
good with respect to the l-th good’s price in absolute value, if the individual demand
functions and their derivatives are convex (equivalently, if the market demand function
and its first derivatives are Schur-convex). The second part states that themore variable,
i.e., unequal, is the distribution of income, the larger is the cross-price elasticity of
demand for the m-th good with respect to the l-th good’s price in absolute value, if
the individual demand functions and their derivatives are concave (equivalently, if the
market demand function and its first derivatives are Schur-concave).
In general, tax (and transfer) policies change income distributions (from x1 to x2,
say) such that the Lorenz curves of the before and the after income distributions
intersect. In order to extend results of the above type to the case of crossing Lorenz
curves, we employ the concept of transfer sensitivity (Definition 2.4). Applying this
definition to market demand functions, we may say that a market demand function
is transfer sensitive (equivalently, downside inequality averse) if the transfer of any
specific amount of income from a poorer to a richer person will increase market
demand by a greater amount, the lower this transfer occurs in the distribution, other
things being equal. Applying the results in Menezes et al. (1980) and Shorrocks and
Foster (1987), Schur-convexmarket demand functionswhich are additive in individual
demand functions with positive first and second derivatives (see Sect. 3) are transfer
sensitive / downside inequality averse if and only if they have negative third derivatives.
This enables us to characterize the effect on market demand elasticity of changes in
income distributions such that Lorenz curves intersect, depending on the sign of the
third derivative of the individual demand function.
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Admittedly, the behavioural implications of the third derivatives of the demand
function are not intuitive. But a number of results in demand analysis have been based
on assumptions on the third derivative of demand. Weyl and Fabinger (2013) rely
on the third derivative of demand to characterize the pass-through rate of wholesale
prices. Ravallion et al. (2000) characterize the behaviour of emissions depending
on assumptions on the third derivative of the emissions demand function. In this
section and “Appendix 3”, we provide examples of demand functions with positive
and negative third derivatives.
3.1 Price elasticities when Lorenz curves intersect (1)
Throughout the rest of the section, x1 = (x11 , . . . , x1K ) and x2 = (x21 , . . . , x2K ) denote
two distributions of the same total income, so that
∑K
i=1 x1i =
∑K
i=1 x2i . This implies
that the average incomes in the two income distributions are the same, and themeans of
the corresponding r.v.’s X1 and X2 with uniform distribution on the sets of components
of x1 and x2 coincide: μX1 = E(X1) = E(X2) = μX2 . Let the Lorenz curve corre-
sponding to the income distribution vector x1 (the r.v. X1 with uniform distribution on
the set of components of x1) cross that corresponding to the income distribution vector
x2 (the r.v. X2) once from above. We first take the case where the variance V (X1) of
the r.v. X1 is not greater than the variance V (X2) of X2 : V (X1) ≤ V (X2).
Theorem 3.2 Let goods m and l be complements. Then:
(i) Let the functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl be convex with respect to x, and
let φ′′′m (P, x) < 0 and ∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x < 0 for (P, x) ∈ S1. Suppose that
(P, x1), (P, x2) ∈ S2 are such that the Lorenz curve corresponding to x1 crosses
that corresponding to x2 once from above, and the variance V (X1) of the r.v. X1
is not greater than the variance V (X2) of the r.v. X2. Then |eml(x1)| > |eml(x2)|.
(ii) Let the functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl be concave with respect to x, and
let φ′′′m (P, x) > 0 and ∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x > 0 for (P, x) ∈ S1. Suppose that
(P, x1), (P, x2) ∈ S2 are such that the Lorenz curve corresponding to x1 crosses
that corresponding to x2 once from above, and the variance V (X1) of the r.v. X1
is not greater than the variance V (X2) of the r.v. X2. Then |eml(x1)| < |eml(x2)|.
When goods m and l are substitutes, these implications are correspondingly
reversed.
Proof in “Appendix 2.1”
Thus, under the additional assumptions of Theorem 3.2 for the case of crossing
Lorenz curves relative to Theorem 3.1, an increase in downside inequality in the
distribution of the income reduces the absolute value of the cross-price elasticity of
demand on them-th goodwith respect to the l-th good’s price, if the individual demand
functions φm(P, x) and their derivatives are convex in income levels x (equivalently, if
the market demand function m(P, x) and its first derivatives are Schur-convex with
respect to income distribution vectors x). Also, under the additional assumptions of
Theorem3.2, an increase in downside inequality in the distribution of income increases
the absolute value of the cross-price elasticity of demand for them-th goodwith respect
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to the l-th good’s price, if the individual demand functions and their derivatives are
concave (equivalently, if themarket demand function and its first derivatives are Schur-
concave).
Remark 3.1 Theorem 3.2 generalizes to the case where the condition ∂4φm(P, x)/
∂pl∂3x ≤ (≥) 0 replaces the corresponding strict inequality conditions.
Proof in “Appendix 2.2”
Corollary 3.1 Consider the own-price elasticity of market demand for any good:
(i) If the functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pm are convex with respect to x for
(P, x) ∈ S1, and φ′′′m (P, x) < 0 and ∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x < 0, then |emm(x1)| >
|emm(x2)| under the conditions (a) (P, x1), (P, x2) ∈ S2, (b) The Lorenz curve
corresponding to x1 crosses that corresponding to x2 once from above, and (c)
The variance of X1 is not greater than that of X2.
(ii) If the functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pm are concave with respect to x for
(P, x) ∈ S1, and
φ′′′m (P, x) > 0 and ∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x > 0, then |emm(x1)| < |emm(x2)| under
the same conditions stated above in (i).
Under the assumptions in part (i) of the result above, an increase in downside
inequality in the distribution of income will reduce the absolute value of the own-price
elasticity of demand if the individual demand functions φm(P, x) and their derivatives
are convex in income levels x (equivalently, if the market demand function m(P, x)
and its first derivatives are Schur-convex with respect to income distribution vectors
x). Under the same assumptions, an increase in downside inequality in the distribution
of income will reduce the absolute value of the own-price elasticity of the demand if
the individual demand functions and their derivatives are concave (equivalently, if the
market demand function and its first derivatives are Schur-concave).
3.1.1 Example
Example 3.1 Deaton andMuelbauer (1980) introduced and estimated theAlmost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS) using data on consumer expenditures in Britain. Consider a
market demand function m(P, x) in the AIDS form:
m(P, x) = Y
⎡
⎣αm +
M∑
j=1
γmj log p j + βm
(∑K
i=1 xi log xi
Y
−α0 −
M∑
k=1
αk log pk − 1
2
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
γk j log pk log p j
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
where Y = ∑Ki=1 xi , and αi , βi , γi j are parameters such that
∑M
k=1 αk =
1,
∑M
i=1 γi j =
∑M
j=1 γi j =
∑M
k=1 βk = 0, γi j = γ j i .
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Table 1 Deaton andMuelbauer (1980) estimates of βm from the almost ideal demand system using annual
data on consumer expenditures in Britain over the period 1954 to 1974
Good Food Clothing Housing Fuel
βm −0.16 0.091 −0.104 0.033
t-Value (−6.1) (3.7) (−5.1) (1)
Good Drink and tobacco Transport and communication Other goods Other services
βm 0.028 0.029 0.022 0.06
t-Value (1.2) (2.6) (0.9) (2.4)
It is obvious that:
φm(P, x) = x
⎡
⎣αm +
M∑
j=1
γmj log p j + βm
(
x log x
K x
−α0 −
M∑
k=1
αk log pk − 1
2
M∑
j=1
M∑
k=1
γk j log pk log p j
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
and
∂φm(P, x)/∂pl = x
[
γml
pl
− βm αl
pl
−
M∑
k=1
γkl
pl
log pk
]
.
Therefore: φ′′′m (P, x) = −βm/x2 and ∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x = 0.
When βm > 0, φm(P, x) is a convex function and φ′′′m (P, x) < 0. According
to the empirical results of Deaton and Muelbauer (1980) presented in Table 1, an
increase in downside inequality in the distribution of income would have reduced the
absolute value of the own-price elasticity of the demand for clothing, and transport
and communications (non-necessities).
When βm < 0, φm(P, x) is a concave function and φ′′′m (P, x) > 0. An increase in
downside inequality in the distribution of income would have increased the absolute
value of the own-price elasticity of the demand for food and housing (necessities).
Other examples extended from Ibragimov and Ibragimov (2007) are presented in
“Appendix 3”.
3.2 Price elasticities when Lorenz curves intersect (2)
We now turn to the case where the variance of the r.v. X1 is larger than the variance
of X2 : V (X1) > V (X2), again with the Lorenz curve corresponding to x1 crossing
that corresponding to x2 once from above. Theorem 3.2 is not helpful. Employing
Proposition 2.3, it is possible to order the market demand elasticities conditioned
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on x1 and on x2, based on the relative strengths of the degree of transfer sensitivity
(downside inequality aversion) and the degree of inequality aversion, pertaining to
the demand function. Recall that a more transfer sensitive demand function is one
for which the transfer of any specific amount of income from a poorer to a richer
person will increase demand by a greater amount, the lower this transfer occurs in
the distribution, other things being equal. A more inequality averse demand function
is one for which any reduction in inequality through a non-intersecting shift of the
Lorenz curve will increase demand by a greater amount, other things being equal.
3.2.1 Demand function for good (m) under different income distributions
Theorem 3.3 Let goods m and l be complements. Let the functions φm(P, x) and
∂φm(P, x)/∂pl be convex (concave) with respect to x for (P, x) ∈ S1. Further, let
the Lorenz curve corresponding to x1 cross that corresponding to x2 once from above,
and let the variance V (X1) of the r.v. X1 be greater than the variance V (X2) of the
r.v. X2. Then for (P, x1), (P, x2) ∈ S2:
|eml(x1)| ≥ |eml(x2)|
if either of the following conditions hold:
•
m(P, x1) ≤ m(P, x2)
− φ
′′′
m (P, x)
φ′′m(P, x)
≤ −∂φ
′′′
m (P, x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m(P, x)/∂pl
for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
•
∂m(P, x1)/∂pl ≤ ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl
− ∂φ
′′′
m (P, x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m(P, x)/∂pl
≤ −φ
′′′
m (P, x)
φ′′m(P, x)
for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
Proof in “Appendix 2.3”
That is, given two income distributions, x1 and x2, let x1 be characterized by a
greater degree of downside inequality relative to Pigou–Dalton inequality. Further, let
the market demand for good m be larger under x2 than under x1, and let the market
demand function for good m be characterized by a uniformly smaller ratio −φ′′′m (P,x)
φ′′m (P,x) ,
of third to second derivatives when compared to the corresponding ratio− ∂φ′′′m (P,x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m (P,x)/∂pl
of third to second derivatives of the cross derivative of market demand for good m
with respect to the price of good l. Then the cross-price elasticity eml(x2) of market
demand for the m-th good with respect to the l-th good’s price under x2 is smaller
than the cross-price elasticity eml(x1) under x1, in absolute value.
The same elasticity comparisons also hold if the cross derivative of market demand
for good m with respect to the price of good l is larger under x2 than under x1, and
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the ratio − ∂φ′′′m (P,x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m (P,x)/∂pl
of third to second derivatives of the cross derivative of market
demand for good m, with respect to price of good l is uniformly smaller compared to
the ratio −φ′′′m (P,x)
φ′′m (P,x)
of third to second derivatives of the market demand function for
good m.
When goods m and l are substitutes, the conclusions of this result are correspond-
ingly reversed.
Remark 3.2 In Theorem 3.3, if the inequality signs in the conditions in change from
≤ to ≥, then |eml(x1)| ≤ |eml(x2)|.
3.2.2 Demand functions for different goods (m) and (n) under different income
distributions
Now consider the situation where K consumers in the economy generate demand for
goods m and n. Let m(P, x) = ∑Ki=1 φm(P, xi ) and n(P, x) =
∑K
i=1 ψn(P, xi )
be two corresponding market demand functions, and let the cross elasticities of market
demands with respect to the price of good l be denoted by eml and enl , respectively.
Corollary 3.2 Let goods m and l be complements, and let goods n and l be comple-
ments as well. Then the following conclusions hold:
(i) Suppose that φm(P, x) and ψn(P, x) are convex (concave) functions on S1; for
x1 and x2 ∈ S2, L X1(u) crosses L X2(u) once from above; and the variance of
the r.v. X1 is greater than that of the r.v. X2 : V (X1) > V (X2). Then
−φ
′′′
m (P, x)
φ′′m(P, x)
≤ −ψ
′′′
n (P, x)
ψ ′′n (P, x)
, for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
is equivalent to:
m(P, x2) ≥ n(P, x1) ⇒ m(P, x2) ≥ n(P, x1)
(ii) Suppose that ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl and ∂ψn(P, x)/∂pl are convex (concave) functions
on S1; for x1 and x2 ∈ S2, L X1(u) crosses L X2(u) once from above; and the
variance of the r.v. X1 is greater than that of the r.v. X2 : V (X1) > V (X2). Then
−∂φ
′′′
m (P, x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m(P, x)/∂pl
≤ −∂ψ
′′′
n (P, x)/∂pl
∂ψ ′′n (P, x)/∂pl
, for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
is equivalent to:
∂m(P, x2)/∂pl ≥ ∂n(P, x1)/∂pl ⇒ ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl ≥ ∂n(P, x1)/∂pl
Proof Direct application of Proposition 2.3. unionsq
Now consider two income distributions, x1 and x2, with L X1(u) crossing L X2(u)
once from above, and the variance of the r.v. X1 being greater than that of the r.v. X2 :
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V (X1) > V (X2). Whether the change from x1 to x2 reduces the value of the eml(P, x)
depends on the relative strengths of the degree of inequality aversion and the degree
of downside inequality aversion of cross-price elasticity. The next theorem shows that
even when the cross-price elasticity eml of x2 is greater than that of x1, the same is
also true for another cross-price elasticity enl(P, x) if −ψ
′′′
n (P,x)
ψ ′′n (P,x) and −
∂ψ ′′′n (P,x)/∂pl
∂ψ ′′n (P,x)/∂pl
are uniformly larger than −φ′′′m (P,x)
φ′′m (P,x) and −
∂φ′′′m (P,x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m (P,x)/∂pl , respectively.
Theorem 3.4 Let goods m and l be complements, and so too, goods n and l. Suppose
that φm(P, X), ψn(P, X), ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl and ∂ψn(P, x)/∂pl are convex (concave)
functions on S1; for (P, x1) and (P, x2) ∈ S2, and L X1 crosses L X2 once from above;
and V (X1) > V (X2). Then (i) and (ii) are equivalent.
(i) −φ′′′m (P,x)
φ′′m (P,x) ≤ −
ψ ′′′n (P,x)
ψ ′′n (P,x) ;−
∂φ′′′m (P,x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m (P,x)/∂pl ≤ −
∂ψ ′′′n (P,x)/∂pl
∂ψ ′′n (P,x)/∂pl , for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
(ii) eml(x2) ≥ eml(x1) ⇒ enl(x2) ≥ enl(x1)
Proof in “Appendix 2.4”
Remark 3.1 If the conditions in Theorem 3.4 hold, it can be said that enl has a higher
degree of “downside inequality aversion relative to inequality aversion” than eml ,
noting that cross-price elasticity is neither an additive index nor an inequality index.
4 Tax polices, income distributions, and elasticity of market demand
In 2011, the “squeezed middle” was named the Oxford Dictionaries Word Of The
Year. The squeezed middle has been variously defined. The Resolution Foundation,
a think tank that has been influential in the discussion, has defined it as the 40%
of the population that earns less than the median wage but more than the bottom
10% (Resolution Foundation 2013). Changes in economic conditions that squeeze the
middle class alone shift the Lorenz curve such that it intersects the original Lorenz
curve once from above.
Among various economic changes, tax-benefit systems change the distribution of
income. One type of tax policy change that squeezes the middle class with the new
Lorenz curve single-crossing the old once from above is a move to a flatter tax system.
Mirrlees (1971) showed that optimal tax schedules can be close to linear. While this
result is not robust (Tuomala 1990), flat tax systems have been adopted in many
countries in Eastern Europe.6 We show that a move to flatter taxes, with a higher
personal allowance, and a marginal rate that is intermediate between the old lowest
6 Flat tax systems were introduced in the mid-1990s in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (rates of 24, 25 and
33%, respectively, with a tax exempt amount). In the years from 2001, Russia (13% flat tax on personal
incomes), Ukraine (13%flat tax in 2003), Slovakia (19%flat tax in 2004), Romania (16%flat tax on personal
income and corporate profit from 2005), Macedonia (12% flat tax on personal income and corporate profit
from 2007), Albania (10% flat tax from 2008) and Bulgaria (flat tax rate of 10% for corporate profits and
personal income tax since 2008). In the USA, at the state level, seven states—Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Utah—tax household incomes at a single rate, ranging from
3.07% (Pennsylvania, with no zero-bracket amount) to 5.3% (Massachusetts). Flat tax proposals have strong
Republican support at the Federal level in the USA and within the Conservative part in the UK.
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Fig. 1 The left panel presents the tax schedule: t1(x), the progressive tax schedule and t2(x), the flat rate
tax schedule. The right panel presents the corresponding Lorenz curves
and highest marginal rates, can affect market demand elasticities for specific goods,
acting through changes in income distribution.7
Let 0 ≤ t (x) < 1 denote the tax liability on income x . Assuming that t (x) is
differentiable, the tax system is progressive if the average tax rate rises with income—
∂ (t (x)/x) /∂x > 0. In this case, the post-tax income distribution Lorenz dominates
the pre-tax income distribution (Jakobsson 1971). Suppose the current tax schedule
is represented by t1(X), with a personal allowance set at A1. Consider the effect of
changing the tax schedule to t j (x), j = 2, 3, . . ., with a corresponding personal
allowance set at A j . Let x j be the income distribution after the application of tax
schedule t j (x), and, as before, let X j denote the r.v. with a uniform distribution on
the components of x j .
Dardanoni and Lambert (1988) establish that if tax schedules t1(x) and t2(x) (not
restricted to flat rate schedules or to progressive schedules) generate the same tax
revenue, and if t2(x) crosses t1(x) twice, first from below, then L X2(u) would cross
L X1(u) once fromabove. Thiswill the casewhen a progressive tax schedule is replaced
with a flat rate tax schedule, with a higher personal allowance, and a marginal rate that
is intermediate between the old lowest and highest marginal rates. The after-flat-tax
Lorenz curve will cross the after-progressive-tax Lorenz curve, once from above: the
after-flat-tax income distribution will have less downside inequality than the after-
progressive-tax income distribution (Fig. 1).
Proposition 4.1 (Davies and Hoy 2002) For any progressive tax schedule t1(x), there
exist unique flat rate tax schedules tl(x) and tu(x) that generate the same tax yield,
such that, for any flat rate tax schedule t j (x):
(i) The post-tax income distribution after tax schedule t j Lorenz dominates the post-
tax income distribution after the original progressive tax schedule t1 if t j < tl
7 But in recent UK tax policy changes (the introduction of the 50% marginal rate for incomes over GBP
150,000 in 2009, and the reduction of this marginal rate to 45% in 2012) have not led to single-crossing
Lorenz curves by themselves. So too in the USA, the Bush tax cuts at the upper end, and their expiration
under the Obama administration only change progressivity but do not lead to crossing of Lorenz curves.
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(ii) The post-tax income distribution after tax schedule t j is Lorenz dominated by
the post-tax income distribution after the original progressive tax schedule t1 if
t j > tu
(iii) The post-tax Lorenz curve after tax schedule t j crosses the post-tax Lorenz curve
after the original progressive tax schedule t1 once from above if tl < t j < tu
We now turn to establishing the relationship between tax policy andmarket demand
(consequences of shifting to a flat rate tax from a progressive tax schedule, such that
the associated Lorenz curves intersect); that is, for values of t j where tl < t j < tu .
Note that, we compare tax systems which generate equal amounts of tax revenue,
based on the presumption that behaviour is unaltered by the particular tax system
under consideration.
Suppose tax schedules t2(x) and t1(x) generate the same tax yield, and t2(x) crosses
t1(x) twice, first from below— equivalent to the Lorenz curve of x2 crossing that of x1
once from above. Depending on the variances of x2 and x1, the results in the previous
section apply. As we focus on a flat tax schedule, t2(x), and a progressive tax schedule,
t1(x), the variance of the r.v. X2 is greater than that of the r.v. X1.
Corollary 4.1 Let goods m and l be complements. Suppose tax schedules t2(x) and
t1(x) generate the same tax yield and t2(x) crosses t1(x) twice first from below and
V (X2) > V (X1). If functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl are convex (or concave)
with respect to x for (P, x) ∈ S1, for (P, x2), (P, x1) ∈ S2 and the following either
one condition hold:
•
m(P, x2) ≤ m(P, x1)
−φ
′′′
m (P, x)
φ′′m(P, x)
≤ −∂φ
′′′
m (P, x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m(P, x)/∂pl
for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
•
∂m(P, x2)/∂pl ≤ ∂m(P, x1)/∂pl
−∂φ
′′′
m (P, x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m(P, x)/∂pl
≤ −φ
′′′
m (P, x)
φ′′m(P, x)
for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
then |eml(x2)| ≥ |eml(x1)|.
Suppose that a tax reform results in the old tax schedule crossing the new twice
first from below and a reduction in the variance of the after-tax income distribution,
which leads to more downside inequality and less Pigou–Dalton inequality in the
after-tax income distribution among consumers in the economy. Then how the cross-
price elasticity changes due to a tax reform depends on the strength of the downside
inequality aversion against its own inequality aversion for the market demand function
on good m and its derivative with respect to good l.
Corollary 4.2 Let goods m, n and l be complements. Suppose tax schedules t2(x)
and t1(x) generate the same tax yield and t2(x) crosses t1(x) twice first from below
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and V (X2) > V (X1). If φim(P, x), ψin(P, x), ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl and ∂ψn(P, x)/∂pl
are convex (or concave) functions on S1, for x1 and x2 ∈ S2, then (i) and (ii) are
equivalent.
(i) −φ′′′m (P,x)
φ′′m (P,x) ≤ −
ψ ′′′n (P,x)
ψ ′′n (P,x) ,−
∂φ′′′m (P,x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m (P,x)/∂pl ≤ −
∂ψ ′′′n (P,x)/∂pl
∂ψ ′′n (P,x)/∂pl , for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
(ii) eml(x1) ≥ eml(x2) ⇒ enl(x1) ≥ enl(x2)
Suppose that a tax reform results in the old tax schedule crossing the new twice first
from below and a reduction in the variance of the after-tax income distribution, which
leads to more downside inequality and less Pigou–Dalton inequality in the after-tax
income distribution among consumers in the economy, and the cross-price elasticity
on good m, eml , of x1 is greater than that of x2. Then the same hold for the cross-price
elasticity on good n, enl , if −ψ
′′′
n (P,x)
ψ ′′n (P,x) and −
∂ψ ′′′n (P,x)/∂pl
∂ψ ′′n (P,x)/∂pl , are uniformly larger than
−φ′′′m (P,x)
φ′′m (P,x) and −
∂φ′′′m (P,x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m (P,x)/∂pl , respectively.
5 Conclusions
We characterized the way in which the price elasticity of market demand changes
with income distribution, extending the analysis of Ibragimov and Ibragimov (2007),
allowing shifting Lorenz curves to intersect. We showed that the increase or decrease
in market demand elasticity depends on the Schur-convexity/Schur-concavity as well
as an analogue of “downside inequality aversion” of the (homogeneous) individual
demand function and its derivative with respect to price.
If the Lorenz curve of one income distribution crosses that of another once from
above, and the variance of former is not greater than that of the latter, then there is an
increase in downside inequality in moving from the former to the latter. For goods that
are complements, if the individual demand function is convex, the change between the
former and the latter (increasing or decreasing downside inequality) leads to a change
in cross-price elasticity in the opposite direction. If the individual demand function
is concave, then the increase or decrease in downside inequality leads to a change
in cross-price elasticity in the same direction. If the goods are substitutes, the above
patterns are reversed.
Basedon these results,we characterized theway inwhich changes inmarket demand
elasticity are driven by shifts between progressive and flatter tax schedules. The effect
depends on the values of the second and third derivatives of both the individual demand
function, and its derivative with respect to price. The knowledge of these higher-
order derivatives required for the comparative statics results can be obtained from the
estimated parameters of the AIDS and other demand systems. Such analysis should
be helpful in understanding the effect of a class of direct tax policy changes on market
demand elasticity and thus on market demand.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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6 Appendix 1: Concepts
In this appendix, we set out some additional concepts, definitions and results related
to the analysis in the paper.
A mean-preserving spread (MPS) is defined as any function which, when added to
a probability or density function, transfers weight from the centre of the distribution
to its tails, without changing the mean. This makes the distribution more heavy-tailed.
Similarly, a mean-preserving contraction (MPC) is any function which when added
to a probability or density function, shifts weight from tails towards the center of a
distribution without altering the mean. It is intuitively clear that anyMPSwill increase
inequality and that any MPC will decrease inequality.
Definition 6.1 (Menezes et al. 1980) The change from the income distribution x1 to
distribution x2 is an MPS—equivalently, a series of regressive transfers (the change
from x2 to x1 is an MPC—equivalently, a series of progressive transfers); if S(x) =
FX2(x) − FX1(x) satisfies the following conditions:
(i)
∫ xˆ
0 S(t)dt = 0
(ii)
∫ x
0 S(t)dt ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]where the inequality is strict for some subintervals
within [0, xˆ]
Definition 6.2 (Menezes et al. 1980) A mean-variance-preserving transformation
(MVPT) is a combination of an MPS and an MPC that leaves the overall variance
unchanged, with the MPS occurring at lower income levels than the MPC.
Definition 6.3 (Menezes et al. 1980) The change from x1 to x2 is said to be a downside
inequality increase if D(x) = [FX2(x) − FX1(x)] is such that
(i)
∫ xˆ
0 D(t)dt = 0
(ii)
∫ xˆ
0
∫ t
0 D(y)dydt = 0
(iii)
∫ x
0
∫ t
0 D(y)dydt ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, xˆ] and > 0 for some x ∈ [0, xˆ]
This is equivalent to x2 having more downside risk than x1 as defined by Menezes
et al. (1980) in the context of decisions under risk. They argued that any inequality or
risk index exhibiting transfer sensitivity (downside inequality aversion) would always
assign a higher value to a distribution that has more “downside inequality” or “down-
side risk” than another, in the sense that the former can be obtained from the latter by
a series of mean-variance-preserving transformations (MVPT).
Building on the above concepts and definitions, Chiu (2007) proved the following
result, which is helpful in comparing distributions in terms of downside inequality
aversion when V (X1) > V (X2).
Proposition 6.1 (Chiu 2007) Let x1 = (x11 , . . . , x1K ), x2 = (x21 , . . . , x2K ) be real
vectors with
∑K
i=1 x1i =
∑K
i=1 x2i . Then:
(i) FX2(x)− FX1(x) = D(x)+ C(x) where D(x) is a downside inequality increase
and C(x) an MPC if and only if
∫ xˆ
0
∫ t
0 [FX2(y) − FX1(y)]dydt < 0, and∫ xˆ
x
∫ t
0 [FX2(y) − FX1(y)]dydt ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, xˆ].
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(ii) FX2(x) − FX1(x) = D(x) + S(x) where D(x) is a downside inequality increase
and S(x) an MPS if and only if
∫ xˆ
0
∫ t
0 [FX2(y) − FX1(y)]dydt > 0, and∫ x
0
∫ t
0 [FX2(y) − FX1(y)]dydt ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [0, xˆ].
Based on Proposition 6.1, Chiu (2007) showed that relative ranking of two distri-
butions by an inequality index  is determined by its degree of inequality aversion
and degree of downside inequality aversion. In the special case of single-crossing
Lorenz curves, the function −φ′′′/φ′′ (referred to as “prudence measure”, Kimball
1990) measures the strength of the index’s downside inequality aversion against its
inequality aversion and determines the index’s ranking of x1 and x2.
7 Appendix 2: Proof
7.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof Part (i): According to Theorem 2.1, from the convexity of functions φm(P, x)
and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl with respect to x for (P, x) ∈ S1 it follows that the functions
m(P, x) = ∑Ki=1 φm(P, xi ) and ∂m(P, x)/∂pl =
∑K
i=1 ∂φm(P, xi )/∂pl are
Schur-convex in x on S2. If ∂3φm(P, x)/∂3x < 0 and ∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x < 0, it
follows that m(P, x) and ∂m(P, x)/∂pl are characterized by downside inequality
aversion. By Proposition 2.2, if L X1(u) crosses L X2(u) once from above and V (X
1) ≤
V (X2), then m(P, x1) < m(P, x2) and ∂m(P, x1)/∂pl < ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl . It
follows that
eml(x1) = ∂ logm(P, x1)/∂ log pl = [(∂m(P, x1)/∂pl)pl ]/m(P, x1)
< [(∂m(P, x2)/∂pl)pl ]/m(P, x2) = eml(x2).
Since the goods m and l are complements (∂m(P, x1)/∂pl is non-positive), it is true
that |eml(x1)| > |eml(x2)|.
The proof for part (ii) follows the same argument, with respect to Schur-concave
functions. The functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl are concave with respect to
x for (P, x) ∈ S1. It follows that the functions m(P, x) = ∑Ki=1 φm(P, xi )
and ∂m(P, x)/∂pl = ∑Ki=1 ∂φm(P, xi )/∂pl are Schur-concave in x on S2. If
∂3φm(P, x)/∂3x > 0 and ∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x > 0, then −∂3φm(P, x)/∂3x < 0 and
−∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x < 0, and it follows that −m(P, x) and −∂m(P, x)/∂pl are
characterized by downside inequality aversion. By Proposition 2.2, if L X1(u) crosses
L X2(u) once from above, and V (x
1) ≤ V (x2), then−m(P, x1) < −m(P, x2) and
−∂m(P, x1)/∂pl < −∂m(P, x2)/∂pl and it follows thatm(P, x1) > m(P, x2)
and ∂m(P, x1)/∂pl > ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl . Thus:
eml(x1) = ∂ logm(P, x)/∂ log pl = [(∂m(P, x1)/∂pl)pl ]/m(P, x1)
> [(∂m(P, x2)/∂pl)pl ]/m(P, x2) = eml(x2)
Since the goods m and l are complements, it is true that |eml(x1)| < |eml(x2)|. unionsq
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7.2 Proof of Remark 3.1
Proof Part (i): If the functions ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl are convex with respect to x , then
∂3φm(P, x)/∂pl∂2x ≥ 0.
If ∂3φm(P, x)/∂pl∂2x > 0 and ∂4φm(P, x)/∂pl∂3x = 0, then ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl
can be expressed as ax2 + bx + f (P) where a > 0 and b are some constants. As
variance of X1 is not greater than that of X2, while their means equal each other, for
the additive index, ∂m(P, x1)/∂pl < ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl .
If ∂3φm(P, x)/∂pl∂2x = 0, then ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl can be expressed as ax + g(P),
where a is some constant. As the sum over the elements in x1 are equal to that over
elements in x2, ∂m(P, x1)/∂pl = ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl .
Part (ii): The proof for the concave case follows similar lines. unionsq
7.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof The functions φm(P, x) and ∂φm(P, x)/∂pl are convex (concave) with respect
to x for (P, x) ∈ S1; hence, the functions m(P, x) and ∂m(P, x)/∂pl are Schur-
convex (Schur-concave) in x on S2. By Proposition 2.3, if L X1(u) crosses L X2(u) once
from above, and V (X1) > V (X2), then
−φ
′′′
m (P, x)
φ′′m(P, x)
≤ −∂φ
′′′
m (P, x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m(P, x)/∂pl
for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]
is equivalent to the stating that:
m(P, x1) ≤ m(P, x2) ⇒ ∂m(P, x1)/∂pl ≤ ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl .
As m(P, x1) ≤ m(P, x2), it is true that ∂m(P, x1)/∂pl ≤ ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl .
From this relation, it follows that
eml(x1) = ∂ logm(P, x1)/∂ log pl = [(∂m(P, x1)/∂pl)pl ]/m(P, x1)
≤ [(∂m(P, x2)/∂pl)pl ]/m(P, x2) = eml(x2).
Since goods m and l are complements, it is true that |eml(x1)| ≥ |eml(x2)|.
The proof of the rest of the theorem is similar. unionsq
7.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof If L X1(u) crosses L X2(u) once from above, and V (X
1) > V (X2), then x2 can
be obtained from x1 by a combination of a downside inequality increase and a Pigou–
Dalton inequality decrease. Suppose −φ′′′m (P,x)
φ′′m (P,x) ≤ −
ψ ′′′n (P,x)
ψ ′′n (P,x) and −
∂φ′′′m (P,x)/∂pl
∂φ′′m (P,x)/∂pl ≤
− ∂ψ ′′′n (P,x)/∂pl
∂ψ ′′n (P,x)/∂pl for all x ∈ [0, xˆ]. By Corollary 3.2, this is equivalent to stating
that: m(P, x2) ≥ n(P, x1) ⇒ m(P, x2) ≥ n(P, x1) and ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl ≥
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∂n(P, x1)/∂pl ⇒ ∂m(P, x2)/∂pl ≥ ∂n(P, x1)/∂pl . It follows from these two
implications that:
[∂m(P, x2)/∂pl ]/m(P, x2) ≥ [∂n(P, x1)/∂pl ]/n(P, x1)
⇒ [∂m(P, x2)/∂pl ]/m(P, x2) ≥ [∂n(P, x1)/∂pl ]/n(P, x1).
This is equivalent to the statement:
eml(x2) ≥ eml(x1) ⇒ enl(x2) ≥ enl(x1)
Hence, (i) and (ii) are equivalent. unionsq
8 Appendix 3: Examples
Example 8.1 Consider the following demand function for an individual good:
φm(pm, x) = αx(x−γ pm )x+βpm , where α > 0, β > 0, γ ≥ 0. This is characteristic of
demand for luxuries. One has
φ′′m(pm, x) =
2αβ2 p2m + 2αγβp2m
(x + βpm)3
φ′′′m (pm, x) = −3
2αβ2 p2m + 2αγβp2m
(x + βpm)4
∂φ′′m(pm, x)/∂pm = (γ + β)
4βpm x − 2β2 p2m
(x + βpm)4
∂φ′′′m (pm, x)/∂pm = (γ + β)
−12xβpm + 12β2 p2m
(x + βpm)5
Note that φm satisfies the conditions of part (i) of Corollary 3.1: φm(pm, x) and
∂φm(pm, x)/∂pl are convex with respect to x ;
∂3φm(pm, x)/∂3x < 0, and ∂4φm(pm, x)/∂pl∂3x < 0 on the set
S1={(pm, x) : x >βpm}.
Example 8.2 Consider the following demand function for an individual good:
φm(pm, α, β, x) = αx/(x + βpm), where α, β > 0. This is characteristic of demand
for necessities. One has
φ′′m(pm, x) = −2
αβpm
(x + βpm)3
φ′′′m (pm, x) = 6
αβpm
(x + βpm)4
∂φ′′m(pm, x)/∂pm = −2βα
x − βpm
(x + βpm)4
∂φ′′′m (pm, x)/∂pm = 2βα
3x − 5βpm
(x + βpm)5
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Note that φm satisfies the conditions: φm(Pm, x); ∂φm(Pm, x)/∂pl are concave with
respect to x ; ∂3φm(Pm, x)/∂3x > 0, and ∂4φm(pm, x)/∂pl∂3x > 0 on the set S1 =
{(pm, x) : x > 5βpm/3}.
.
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